Accounting Information Quality, Interbank Competition, and Bank Risk-Taking
研究了银行间竞争与会计信息质量如何共同影响银行的风险承担行为，发现竞争不激烈时提高信息质量会鼓励银行冒更多风险，而竞争激烈时则无影响。
ABSTRACT We study the interaction between interbank competition and accounting information quality and their effects on banks' risk-taking behavior. We identify an endogenous false-alarm cost that banks incur when forced to sell assets to meet capital requirements. We find that when the interbank competition is less intense, an improvement in the quality of accounting information encourages banks to take more risk. Keeping the banks' investments in loans constant, the provision of high-quality accounting information reduces the false-alarm cost of assets sales and improves the discriminating efficiency of the capital requirement policy. When considering the banks' endogenous investment decisions, however, this improvement in discriminating efficiency causes excessive risk-taking, because banks respond by competing more aggressively in the deposit market, and the increase in deposit costs motivates banks to take more risk. Our paper shows that improving information quality increases risk-taking with mild competition, but has no effect under fierce competition.