Portfolio Performance and Agency
分析投资经理的最优合约，发现交易限制能防止经理抵消绩效费激励，并给出简单基准考核成为最优薪酬的条件。
In this paper we analyze the optimal contract for a portfolio manager who can exert effort to improve the quality of a private signal about future market prices. We assume complete markets over states distinguished by asset payoffs and place no restrictions on the form of the contract. We show that trading restrictions are essential because they prevent the manager from undoing the incentive effects of performance-based fees. We provide conditions under which simple benchmarking emerges as optimal compensation. Additional incentives to take risk are necessary when information can be manipulated or else the manager will understate information to offset the benchmarking. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.