Testing Dynamic Models of Worker Effort
基于偷懒效率工资、补偿性差异和工会企业谈判三个模型，推导工人努力程度的动态方程，并用486家英国公司面板数据检验，发现低工会化企业支持偷懒模型，高工会化行业支持谈判模型。
This article derives three dynamic models of worker effort determination based on a shirking efficiency wage model, a compensating differentials model, and a union-firm bargaining model. It shows that all of these three models have the same long-run comparative statics but differ in their short-run dynamics. The authors use these different predictions about the dynamics as a basis for testing the models. Euler equations for each model are estimated using panel data on 486 U.K. companies. The evidence supports the shirking model in firms with low levels of unionization but the bargaining model in highly unionized industries. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.