Salesforce Compensation Scheme and Consumer Inferences
研究销售复杂产品时，企业如何设计薪酬方案（工资、销售佣金、满意度佣金）来激励销售人员，同时避免其夸大产品升级价值，以维护消费者信任和企业利润。
We investigate the salesforce compensation strategy of a firm selling products in a category that several consumers find technically sophisticated, such as electronics or financial products with legal fine print. Consumers are unable to judge the value difference between a baseline product and a product upgrade with add-on features. While the firm and the salespeople are informed of the value of these features, consumers are uncertain. Thus, consumers have to rely on sales assistance to evaluate alternatives. The salesperson decision variables include selling effort and whether to “oversell” the consumer by overclaiming the value of added features. Because sales revenue depends on both the salesperson's selling effort and consumers' valuation of the added features, the salesforce incentive scheme (which can consist of salary, sales commission, or consumer satisfaction-based commission) may induce the short-term oriented salesperson to misrepresent the value of the upgrade. Exaggeration of the value of the added features, however, results in reduced satisfaction levels leading to lower profits for the firm. We show that a salesperson selling products where the value of the upgrade is low prefers to make higher claims when the sales commission rate is sufficiently high. We conjecture that consumers aware of the incentive structure facing the salesperson expect the true value of the add-on feature to be lower than the claimed value. We study the optimal compensation scheme of a firm, which has to communicate her true type and retain its salesforce credibility. We identify the conditions under which a high-upgrade-type firm indicates its true value by altering sales commission rate and satisfaction-based commission rate.