Public Policy and Constitutional Prescription
针对公共政策分析中解释与规定角色的混淆，构建了一个范式，从宪法层面为政治偏好函数或公共部门治理结构提供理论与实证意义，将现行政策视为政治经济过程的理性结果。
Abstract In public policy analysis, much confusion exists about the roles of explanation and prescription. To offer a new perspective, a paradigm is developed that gives both theoretical and empirical meaning to the constitutional determination of political preference functions or public sector governance structures. Current policies are viewed as a rational outcome of a political‐economic process. Three relevant spaces are specified: result, policy instrument, and constitutional. For the policy instrument space, the paradigm provides a framework for generating testable propositions on government behavior, while, for the constitutional space, the framework is prescriptive. The collective‐choice rules of the constitutional space structure the tradeoff between public and special interests.