The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts
研究当专家对某种决策有偏好但也在意声誉时，其信息披露行为如何受偏见强度和透明度影响，发现揭示偏见强度不一定改善信息披露，且引入第二位专家的影响取决于市场能否识别个人贡献。
We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preferences for the status quo. Surprisingly, revealing the intensity of the expert’s bias does not always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a second expert raises the first expert’s incentives to report truthfully when the market can identify the contribution of each expert, but reduces them when only the collective contribution is identified by the market.