Political Economy of Monetary and Budgetary Policy
分析即使债务和工资合同都指数化，政府仍有动机征收意外通胀税，并比较了规则与相机抉择下的最优政策，发现选民倾向于任命比中位选民更关注通胀的央行行长。
Even though all debt and wage contracts are indexed, there is an incentive to levy a surprise inflation tax as this erodes the real value of debt service, permits a cut in the tax rate, and boosts private consumption. With rules it is optimal to smooth tax and seigniorage revenues. However, with discretion (associated with the Markov-perfect equilibrium) the government finances an increase in spending through additional interest income paid on assets that are generated through a temporary bout of inflation and taxation. The electorate prefers to appoint a central banker more concerned with inflation than the median voter. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.