CEO tenure and organizational performance: an intervening model
研究CEO任期如何通过影响高层管理团队的风险倾向和创业行为间接影响企业绩效，使用结构方程模型验证了该中介机制。
Abstract While CEO job tenure is seen as influencing firm performance, the intervening mechanisms that govern this influence have remained largely unexplored. Given that individuals in the firm most closely influenced by the CEO are members of the top management team (TMT), we focus on the CEO‐TMT interface as one important intervening mechanism. Specifically, our tested model suggests that CEO tenure indirectly influences performance through its direct influences on TMT risk‐taking propensity and the firm's pursuit of entrepreneurial initiatives. Results from structural equation modeling are consistent with this model and support its associated hypotheses. In the discussion, we trace the implications of our study for research and practice. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.