Why Press Coverage of a Client Influences the Audit Opinion
通过实验发现，负面媒体报道会让审计师高估客户破产概率，从而更可能出具持续经营意见，即使报道没有新信息。这对审计师、客户和监管者都有启示。
In this study I use an experiment to examine why auditors are more likely to issue going–concern opinions when the client has been the subject of negative press coverage prior to the date of the audit opinion. I find no evidence that negative press coverage increases auditors’ perceptions of legal liability, as was suggested in the prior literature. I do find, however, that negative press coverage increases auditors’ perception of a client's bankruptcy probability and this, in turn, leads auditors to modify the audit opinion. Because the press coverage presented in this study provides no new information, the results suggest that auditors react too strongly to redundant information. This over–reaction can result in inefficient allocation of audit resources and can have deleterious affects on clients. Accordingly, policy makers, auditors and their clients might be interested in how auditors’ reliance on redundant information can be reduced.