On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
研究在多数决选举中，选民如何根据私人信号协调支持两名挑战者以击败不受欢迎的现状，发现均衡中存在有限的策略投票和不完全协调，且策略投票激励在边缘选区较低。
In a plurality-rule election, a group of voters must coordinate behind one of two challengers in order to defeat a disliked status quo. Departing from existing work, the support for each challenger must be inferred from the private observation of informative signals. The unique equilibrium involves limited strategic voting and incomplete coordination. This is driven by negative feedback: an increase in strategic voting by others reduces the incentives for a voter to act strategically. Strategic-voting incentives are lower in relatively marginal elections, after controlling for the distance from contention of a trailing preferred challenger. A calibration applied to the U.K. General Election of 1997 is consistent with the impact of strategic voting and the reported accuracy of voters' understanding of the electoral situation. Copyright 2007, Wiley-Blackwell.