Agency Theory and Stochastic Dominance
用随机占优方法分析代理理论中的契约结构，解释委托人与代理人之间的分成规则，适合研究契约设计和道德风险的经济学者判断是否阅读原文。
Recently, agency theory has become popular as a means of explaining the structure of contracts between various classes of economic agents. Oftentimes the contracts of interest represent sharing rules for the payoffs that result from some production activity. In the usual two-party model of the contracting problem, one party designated the principal delegates authority for decisions affecting production to another party designated the agent. Typically, the assumptions made about the consequences of the agent's actions are that they are associated with effort on the part of the agent for which the agent (but not the principal) has disutility, and that greater effort will result in higher payoffs from production in every state of nature. Moral hazard is then introduced by assuming that the principal is unable to observe the agent's effort, or to infer what effort the agent applied through an ex post observation of the payoff that results.