Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?
研究了中央银行透明度对货币市场多重均衡的影响，发现透明度提高会减少多重均衡的可能性，因为交易者会根据自身私有信息利用公共信息。
Abstract A recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders; see Morris and Shin (2001). It is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise. This has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge. We develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information, because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information. Thus, transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely.