Equilibrium Incentive Contracts and Efficiency Wages
分析当产出可签约但企业无法观察工人努力和匹配生产率时的最优工资合同，发现工人享有租金导致失业，但无税收和失业补助时激励强度是约束有效的，且更强激励合同与更高失业率相关。
We analyze the optimal (efficiency) wage contract when output is contractible but firms neither observe the workers' effort nor their match-specific productivity. Firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs. As a result, employed workers enjoy rents, which in turn creates unemployment. Nonetheless, the incentive power of the equilibrium wage contract is constrained efficient in the absence of taxes and unemployment benefits. We also show that more high-powered incentive contracts tend to be associated with higher equilibrium unemployment rates.