An Expected‐Indemnity Approach to the Measurement of Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance
提出用预期赔付而非投入使用量来定义农作物保险中的道德风险，利用堪萨斯州小麦农场五年面板数据检验，发现道德风险在歉收年份影响赔付，而在生长条件好的年份不显著。
Abstract A definition of moral hazard in multiple peril crop insurance is proposed that focuses on expected indemnities rather than input use. Five years of production and insurance data for a panel of Kansas wheat farms is used to empirically test for this type of moral hazard. Results suggest that moral hazard affects multiple peril crop insurance indemnities in poor production years but that no significant moral hazard occurs in years when growing conditions are favorable.