The Problem of Free Riding in Voluntary Generic Advertising: Parallelism and Possible Solutions from the Lab
通过实验室实验模拟自愿性通用广告中的搭便车问题，发现捐赠结果与历史案例高度相似，并测试了提供点机制作为强制性方案的替代，同时发现退款请求捐赠机制能减少搭便车。
Abstract Producers of many commodities pay for generic advertising, which is a public good for producers and, in cases like healthy foods, enhances social welfare. Though most programs were initially funded through the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, many became mandatory to mitigate free riding. This experimental research simulates key economic and psychological details of these programs and produces donation results strikingly similar to a historic example. Because mandatory programs may be declared unconstitutional, the Provision Point Mechanism is tested as an alternative. This research also shows that refund‐by‐request donation mechanisms establish a status quo of contributing and reduce free riding.