Vaporware as a Means of Entry Deterrence
研究了计算机企业通过虚假预发布新产品来威慑潜在进入者的现象，证明雾件是信号博弈中的均衡策略，并分析了其对消费者福利的模糊影响。
Firms in the computer industry are often accused of vaporware, the untruthful pre‐announcement of a new version of their product. By claiming they have a new product, critics argue, these firms try to deter potential entrants. The paper analyzes this phenomenon. It shows that vaporware is an equilibrium strategy in a signaling game in which the possibility to market a new product is private information. In this model, the possibility of vaporware can hurt consumers, also in the case the incumbent does have a new version of its product. The welfare effects of vaporware are ambiguous.