State Trading Companies, Time Inconsistency, Imperfect Enforceability and Reputation
用现代博弈论分析国有贸易公司和大企业在战略贸易中的时间不一致问题，特别适用于生产周期长的农产品贸易，探讨信号传递、声誉和第三方干预的影响。
Strategic trade in international markets is important for agricultural and other basic commodities. State trading companies (STCs) and large private firms control most of the trade volume. In this study the authors use concepts of modern game theory to treat time inconsistency issues associated with strategic trade. The results are particularly applicable to trade in commodities with lengthy production periods, such as agriculture. The model considered here provides an important context for exploring impacts of signaling, reputation, and third party interventions that approximate the institutions and authorities that govern international trade.