Is Child Labor Inefficient?
构建了一个童工模型，研究其福利含义。假设童工与人力资本积累存在权衡，即使父母有利他心且童工社会无效率，均衡中仍可能出现童工，原因在于父母未能完全内化其负面影响。文章还分析了禁止童工的效果及其在一般均衡中实现帕累托改进的条件。
We build a model of child labor and study its implications for welfare. We assume that there is a trade-off between child labor and the accumulation of human capital. Even if parents are altruistic and child labor is socially inefficient, it may arise in equilibrium because parents Fail to fully internalize its negative effects, This occurs when bequests are zero or when capital markers are imperfect. We also study the effects of a simple ban on child labor and derive conditions under which it may be Pareto improving in general equilibrium. We show that the implications of child labor for fertility are ambiguous.