The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
研究重复委托代理模型中长期契约是否优于短期契约，发现仅存在道德风险时，若短期契约能充分惩罚代理人，则无需长期承诺，跨期关联无法改善激励与风险分担的权衡。
In repeated principal-agent models, long-term contracts can improve on short-term contracts only if they commit either principal or agent to a payoff in some future circumstance lower than could be obtained from a short-term contract negotiated if that circumstance occurs. We show that efficient contracting under moral hazard alone does not require long-term commitment from the principal. Provided a short-term contract can punish the agent sufficiently (in a sense made precise), it requires no commitment from the agent either. Then linking payoffs in one period to outcomes in previous periods does not improve the tradeoff between incentives and risk sharing.