Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang
在一个政府无法承诺政策的小型开放经济中，最优资本税和主权债务政策导致投资与债务负相关，产生“债务积压”效应；若政府贴现率高于市场，资本将永久低于最优水平。
We characterize optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt policy in a small open economy where the government cannot commit to policy and seeks to insure a risk averse domestic constituency. The expected tax on capital is shown to vary with the state of the economy, generating cyclicality in investment and debt in an environment where the first best capital stock is a constant. The government’s lack of commitment induces a negative correlation between investment and the stock of government debt, a “debt overhang ” effect. If the government discounts the future at a rate higher than the market, then capital oscillates indefinitely at a level strictly below the first best. Debt relief is never Pareto improving and cannot affect the longrun level of investment. Further, restricting the government to a balanced budget can eliminate the cyclical distortion of investment. ∗ We thank comments and suggestions from Emmanuel Farhi, Doireann Fitzgerald, Roberto Rigobon, and Dietrich Vollrath and seminar participants at several places. We owe a special debt to Ivan Werning, who was particularly generous with his time and suggestions. We thank Oleg Itshokhi for excellent research assistance. 1 1