Endogenous Tariff Formation: The Case of Mercosur
以南方共同市场为例，分析区域贸易协定中例外条款的决定因素，发现行业游说可以解释共同对外关税及成员国的偏离，表明该组织具有政治经济基础。
Mercosur appears as an interesting case study for analyzing the determinants of exceptions in regional trade agreements. Its member countries—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay—intended to make Mercosur a full customs union by January 1995. This goal turned out to be too ambitious, and the Protocol of Ouro Preto and other agreements signed in December 1994 led to a hybrid solution. Overall, out of a total of 9,119 tariff lines, around 30 percent are subject, in at least one member country, to either external deviations from the common external tariff or internal deviations from free trade. Thus an important set of holes remains under the existing agreement, leading some authors to consider Mercosur an incomplete customs union. This article compares the results of the theoretical literature on endogenous tariff formation with evidence from Mercosur. The results show that Mercosur's common external tariff and member countries' deviations from it and from internal free trade can be explained by sector or industry lobbying as predicted by the endogenous tariff literature. If a viable political economy is a key to success, then Mercosur is here to stay.