The Welfare Economics of Default Options in 401(k) Plans
研究了401(k)养老金计划中默认缴费率如何影响选择，分析了不同行为模型下最优默认值、福利效应和规范模糊性，发现将默认设为雇主匹配的最高缴费率或零都有合理依据。
Default contribution rates for 401(k) pension plans powerfully influence choices. Potential causes include opt-out costs, procrastination, inattention, and psychological anchoring. Using realistically parameterized models, we show how the optimal default, the magnitude of the welfare effects, and the degree of normative ambiguity depend on the behavioral model, the scope of the choice domain deemed welfare-relevant, the use of penalties for passive choice, and other 401(k) plan features. While results are theory-specific, our analysis provides reasonably robust justifications for setting the default either at the highest contribution rate matched by the employer or—contrary to common wisdom—at zero.