Buyer Collusion and Efficiency of Government Intervention in Wheat Markets in Northern India: An Asymmetric Structural Auctions Analysis
利用拍卖理论分析印度北部小麦批发市场，发现买方不对称加剧了合谋对价格的压低效应，并评估政府以最低支持价收购小麦是否支付过高，结论是样本期内并未支付过高。
This article uses auction theory to analyze wholesale markets for wheat in Northern India. This approach enables us to characterize the market in terms of buyer asymmetries, to detect the existence of collusion, and to quantify its impact on market prices. We show that buyer asymmetries exacerbate the downward impact of collusion on prices. The article also considers whether the government paid too much for the wheat it procured at the minimum support price, and shows that for our sample it did not. The article is based on a primary survey of two wholesale markets in North India. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.