Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption
通过随机分组实验，研究印度驾驶执照分配中的腐败现象，发现奖金和免费课程组更易获证，但奖金组更多通过中介支付额外费用且无驾驶技能，表明腐败扭曲了资源配置。
We study the allocation of driver's licenses in India by randomly assigning applicants to one of three groups: bonus (offered a bonus for obtaining a license quickly), lesson (offered free driving lessons), or comparison. Both the bonus and lesson groups are more likely to obtain licenses. However, bonus group members are more likely to make extralegal payments and to obtain licenses without knowing how to drive. All extralegal payments happen through private intermediaries ("agents"). An audit study of agents reveals that they can circumvent procedures such as the driving test. Overall, our results support the view that corruption does not merely reflect transfers from citizens to bureaucrats but distorts allocation.