Implementable Ramsey‐Boiteux Pricing in Agricultural and Environmental Policy
探讨农业中基于产品特征或生产方式的歧视性定价如何最优设定，证明在农民类型信息隐藏下，修正的拉姆齐-布瓦特定价仍可实施，对政策制定者设计自愿性农业环境政策有参考价值。
Abstract Agricultural producers frequently face price discrimination that is based either on characteristics of their products, or on the physical manner in which the product is produced. We consider how to set such discriminatory prices optimally and show that for a very broad range of production technologies, the first‐best voluntary policy, which involves a modified version of Ramsey‐Boiteux pricing, is implementable even in the presence of hidden knowledge by farmers about their types.