Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms
基于社会比较理论，研究了中国上市公司中政治关联董事会与高管薪酬的关系，发现政治关联董事会与高管薪酬水平及薪酬差距负相关，并削弱了薪酬与业绩的关联。
Drawing on social comparison theory, this study examines the relationship between politically connected boards and top executive pay. Moreover, given the socialist orientation of China, tests are also carried out to establish the relationship between politically connected directors and pay dispersion across the firm. We find a negative association between politically connected boards and top executive pay. We also find that politically connected boards are negatively associated with pay dispersion, i.e., the higher the number of political directors on the board the smaller the gap between top executive pay and average employee pay. Finally, our study shows that politically connected directors weaken the pay‐performance link. These findings have important theoretical, policy, and managerial implications . Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.