Fragmented Property Rights and Incentives for R&D
当产品创新需要多项互补专利时，碎片化产权会限制企业研发投入。本文分析多同时研发竞赛中的研发强度，以及已有专利和绕路发明选项的影响，发现多专利产品存在严重的敲竹杠问题，会降低整体研发努力。
Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R&D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival.