Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols
研究韩国财阀企业是否通过私募证券发行进行隧道行为，发现集团内部交易中发行价被操纵以利于控股股东，且相关公告收益差异支持隧道行为的存在。
ABSTRACT We examine whether equity‐linked private securities offerings are used as a mechanism for tunneling among firms that belong to a Korean chaebol. We find that chaebol issuers involved in intragroup deals set the offering prices to benefit their controlling shareholders. We also find that chaebol issuers (member acquirers) realize an 8.8% (5.8%) higher (lower) announcement return than do other types of issuers (acquirers) if they sell private securities at a premium to other member firms, and if the controlling shareholders receive positive net gains from equity ownership in issuers and acquirers. These results are consistent with tunneling within business groups.