Decentralized Multi-Echelon Supply Chains: Incentives and Information
研究产品需经多个站点串联的供应链中，因站点经理各自优化自身绩效而导致的激励问题，并分析转移定价、寄售、缺货补偿等机制如何实现成本节约、激励相容与信息分散化。
Consider a supply chain in which a product must pass through multiple sites located in series before it is finally delivered to outside customers. Incentive problems may arise in this system when decisions are delegated to corresponding site managers, each maximizing his/her own performance metric. From the overall system's point of view, the decentralized supply chain may not be as efficient as the centralized one. In practice, alternative performance mechanisms are often used to align the incentives of the different managers in a supply chain. This paper discusses the cost conservation, incentive compatibility, and informational decentralizability properties of these mechanisms. In particular, for a special type of supply chain, we show that a performance measurement scheme involving transfer pricing, consignment, shortage reimbursement, and an additional backlog penalty at the last downstream site satisfies all these properties.