Ownership form, Managerial Incentives, and the Intensity Of Rivalry
研究了连锁企业中直营店与加盟店的所有权差异如何影响管理者激励和定价竞争，发现直营店在集中市场中能提高自身和对手价格，从而获得更高绩效。
This study investigates how differences in ownership form—between franchised and company-owned units—affect managerial incentives and competitive pricing in different oligopolistic contexts. We argue that chains may restrict decision making in company-owned units as a commitment device to maintain high prices in concentrated markets and found evidence consistent with this argument. We also found that a unit's ownership form affected its rivals' competitive behavior. Our results indicate that company-owned units' ability to raise their own and rivals' prices in highly concentrated markets led to their higher performance relative to franchised units.