Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption
研究不确定性下无限期消费问题中易受诱惑的代理人行为，定义并刻画动态自我控制偏好，发现均衡可能存在低效，稳态消费随自我控制增加而上升，且债务合同可在仅以终止合同为惩罚时维持。
To study the behavior of agents who are susceptible to temptation in infinite horizon consumption problems under uncertainty, we define and characterize dynamic self-control (DSC) preferences. DSC preferences are recursive and separable. In economies with DSC agents, equilibria exist but may be inefficient; in such equilibria, steady state consumption is independent of initial endowments and increases in self-control. Increasing the preference for commitment while keeping self-control constant increases the equity premium. Removing nonbinding constraints changes equilibrium allocations and prices. Debt contracts can be sustained even if the only feasible punishment for default is the termination of the contract. Copyright Econometric Society 2004.