Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry
研究了生产率不同的流动企业在税收竞争中的分布效应，发现社会最优税率需协调且能提供最优企业数量，但纳什均衡下税率过低且企业过多，揭示了税收竞争的新扭曲和协调的好处。
This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by their productivities. Because taxes affect the distribution of firms, they affect wages, prices, and the number of firms. From the social planner's perspective, optimal taxes efficiently distribute income between private and public consumption and are harmonized, providing the optimal number of firms. This is not a Nash equilibrium. As is common in such models, equilibrium taxes are inefficiently low. Furthermore, there is no pure strategy equilibrium with equal taxes resulting in too many firms. This illustrates a new distortion from tax competition and a new benefit from harmonization.