Counterparty Risk in Financial Contracts: Should the Insured Worry about the Insurer?
研究了金融保险合同中交易对手风险的影响，发现保险人一方存在新的道德风险问题，导致被保险人面临过度交易对手风险，并可能激励被保险人披露关于索赔可能性的优越信息。
We analyze the effect of counterparty risk on financial insurance contracts, using the case of credit risk transfer in banking. This paper posits a new moral hazard problem on the insurer side of the market, which causes the insured party to be exposed to excessive counterparty risk. We find that this counterparty risk can create an incentive for the insured party to reveal superior information about the likelihood of a claim. In particular, a unique separating equilibrium may exist, even in the absence of any costly signaling device. (c) 2010 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology..