RETURNS SYSTEM WITH REBATES*
研究了垄断供应商与原子型零售商之间的报童问题，提出一种带有回扣的退货系统，通过设定回购价格和事后补贴，实现渠道最优生产和销售策略，最大化期望利润。
We consider a variant of the newsvendor problem. Atomistic retailers each buy merchandise from a monopoly supplier for resale at a market‐determined common retail price that depends upon the total industry order quantity and upon a stochastic demand. After the orders are filled, the supplier learns the realization of demand but the retailers do not. We show that, in this setting, a returns system with rebates (with previously set buy‐back price for returns and ex post payments from the supplier to each retailer per unit actually sold) implements the optimal production and sales strategy, attaining maximum expected profit in the channel.