Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games
提出一种多阶段讨价还价程序，将讨价还价与合作视为叠加在战略形式博弈上的互动，并建立与经典合作博弈解（如夏普利值）的联系，同时指出在非转移效用情形下传统联盟函数的局限性。
In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash’s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies, the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.