Project Evaluation and Control in Decentralized Firms: Is Capital Rationing Always Optimal?
分析委托代理模型，发现当资本与管理者努力为互补品时，企业可能对项目采取宽松标准而非严格配给，解释了为何企业对待不同项目态度有别。
When capital investments are made in an agency setting, we show that, even without risk considerations, capital rationing need not be the only rational outcome. We analyze a principal-agent model with risk neutrality and with two productive inputs: the agent's efforts and capital investment. The two inputs can be either economic complements or substitutes. The agent has pre-contract private information about his own type. The output is measured with an additive noise. We show that when the two inputs are substitutes, the optimal solution entails a marginal capital rationing. But when the two inputs are complements, then either a marginal capital rationing or a marginal leniency could be the optimal response. Our results, therefore, provide an explanation for why firms may employ a capital rationing for a project that may increase manufacturing complexity and hence may reduce (managerial) labor productivity, yet employ a less strict criterion for evaluating a productivity-enhancing project. This result contrasts with earlier results where only a capital rationing is shown to be optimal.