Taxes versus quantities for a stock pollutant with endogenous abatement costs and asymmetric information
比较了在监管者与企业对减排成本信息不对称且企业投资影响未来成本时，排放税与配额两种政策的效率差异，发现配额在信息约束下更优，而税收在特定情形下也有优势。
We compare emissions taxes and quotas when a (strategic) regulator and (non-strategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov perfect decision rules. Firms make investment decisions that affect their future abatement costs. For general functional forms, firms’ investment policy is information-constrained efficient when the regulator uses a quota, but not when the regulator uses an emissions tax. This advantage of quotas over emissions taxes has not previously been recognized. For a special functional form (linear–quadratic) both policies are constrained efficient. Using numerical methods, we find that a tax has some advantages in this case.