Bargaining with imperfect enforcement
构建了一个考虑非合作执行的讨价还价模型，发现这会限制协议的不平等程度，导致贴现率非单调变化，并解释为何各方可能故意签订不完全合同以增强议价能力。
The game‐theoretic bargaining literature insists on a noncooperative bargaining procedure but implicitly assumes “cooperative” implementation of agreements. In reality, courts cannot implement agreements costlessly, and parties often prefer to use “noncooperative” implementation. We present a bargaining model which incorporates the idea that agreements may be enforced noncooperatively. We show that this has a substantial impact in limiting the inequality of agreements, and results in a nonmonotonicity of the discount rate. The model also explains why some parties may have incentives to deliberately write incomplete contracts as a way to enhance their bargaining power.