Ceos On the Edge: Earnings Manipulation and Stock-Based Incentive Misalignment
结合代理理论和前景理论，研究股权激励对CEO盈余操纵行为的影响，发现持有更多价外期权和较低持股的CEO更可能操纵盈余，且公司绩效和任期会调节这一关系。
Synthesizing agency theory and prospect theory, we examined the effects of stock-based incentives on CEO earnings manipulation behaviors. In analyses of data compiled from the public companies listed in Compustat's Executive Compensation Database and a U.S. General Accounting Office restatements database, we found that CEOs were more likely to manipulate firm earnings when they had more out-of-the-money options and lower stock ownership. Firm performance and CEO tenure interacted with out-of-the-money options and ownership to influence CEO earnings manipulation behaviors. Our findings inform agency-based views by providing evidence that, under certain conditions, stock-based managerial incentives lead to incentive misalignment.