Moral hazard, hold‐up, and the optimal allocation of control rights
研究了在经理存在道德风险且经理与投资者可能事后相互敲竹杠的模型中，控制权如何最优配置，发现要么由投资者独享控制权，要么根据中期业绩好坏决定经理是否保留控制权。
I examine the optimal allocation of control rights in a model with manager moral hazard, where the manager and investor may hold up each other ex post. The control allocation determines both the likelihood of hold‐up and the agents’ renegotiation payoffs. In equilibrium, only two control allocations are optimal: either exclusive investor control or a contingent control allocation that allows the manager to remain in control if, and only if, interim performance is good. Thus, my model explains why it may be optimal to link control to the firm’s performance such that managers retain control only following good performance.