Tenure Profiles and Efficient Separation in a Stochastic Productivity Model
构建基于有效谈判的理论模型，利用实物期权理论推导工人与企业的有效分离规则，发现工资数据无法揭示真实任期曲线，且约80%的任期工资回报源于外部生产率的选择性。
We develop a theoretical model based on efficient bargaining, where both log outside productivity and log productivity in the current job follow a random walk. This setting allows the application of real option theory. We derive the efficient worker-firm separation rule. We show that wage data from completed job spells are uninformative about the true tenure profile. The model is estimated on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. It fits the observed distribution of job tenures well. Selection of favorable random walks can account for the concavity in tenure profiles. About 80% of the estimated wage returns to tenure is due to selectivity in the realized outside productivities.