演化动态下被支配策略的生存

Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

Theoretical Economics · 2011
被引 70
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

证明了任何满足四个温和条件的确定性演化动态都无法在某些博弈中消除严格被支配策略,且现有消除结果对动态的微小变化不稳健,数值分析显示被支配策略能以非平凡频率持续存在。

Abstract

We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.

演化动力学严格占优策略策略存续博弈论