Bubbles and Information: An Experiment
通过实验研究信息分布对资产泡沫的影响，发现信息不对称（部分交易者了解未来股息）能显著减小泡沫，提高市场效率。
A symmetric distribution of information, although omnipresent in real markets, is rarely considered in experimental economics. We study whether information about imminent future dividends can abate bubbles in experimental asset markets. We find that markets with asymmetrically informed traders have significantly smaller bubbles than markets with symmetrically informed or uninformed traders. Hence, fundamental values are better reflected in market prices—implying higher market efficiency—when some traders know more than others about future dividends. This suggests that bubbles are abated when traders know that a subset of them have an edge (in information) over others. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, Teck Ho, and Terrance Odean, special issue editors.