The Dependence of pay—Performance Sensitivity on the Size of the Firm
分析企业规模如何影响高管薪酬与股东财富的关联程度，发现CEO薪酬绩效敏感性与企业规模的平方根近似成反比，并探讨了高管团队薪酬绩效敏感性的类似性质。
I analyze the relationship between firm size and the extent to which executive compensation depends on the wealth of the firm's shareholders. I use a simple agency model to motivate an econometric model of this relationship. Estimating this model on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation data using nonlinear least squares, I determine that pay-performance sensitivity (as defined by Jensen and Murphy (1990b)) appears to be approximately inversely proportional to the square root of firm size (however measured). I also analyze the properties of pay- performance sensitivity for "teams" of executives working for the same firm and show it to have similar properties as CEO pay-performance sensitivity. © 1998 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology