Proprietorial Control in Family Firms: Some Functions of “Quasi-Organic” Management System
通过访谈建筑行业家族企业的所有者和高级管理者，揭示了“准有机”管理结构如何在授予高级管理者一定自主权的同时，不威胁所有者的决策特权。
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the strategies of managerial control which are used by the proprietors of family-owned business enterprises. Interviews with the proprietors and senior managers of businesses in the building industry illustrate the “quasi-organic” nature of management structures. These grant some autonomy to senior managers without threatening proprietorial decision-making prerogatives. Although the family firm has certain distinctive features, similar control strategies designed to ensure that delegated decisions are “reliable” and “responsible” are evident in various types of business enterprise. There is, then, scope for further comparative research within a conceptual framework which does not entirely divorce the family firm from other business organizations.