Asymmetric Information, Collateral, and Moral Hazard
研究信贷市场中，事前信息不对称下抵押品如何识别借款人并引发道德风险，发现高质量企业的最优抵押贷款合同涉及超额抵押，且资产维护存在投资不足与过度投资现象。
In a credit market characterized by a priori asymmetric information, collateral not only can identify credit applicants but also can result in moral hazard involving the borrower's use of pledged assets. The borrower's other alternatives are to apply for unsecured bank credit and be priced as average, or to acquire financing by selling an asset and subsequently renting it for continued use. The optimal secured loan contract for higher quality firms is shown to involve overcollateralization. There is underinvestment relative to first best in maintenance of the pledged assets but overinvestment relative to the level that would be chosen without bank monitoring. Self-financing and unsecured credit are chosen by the intermediate and lowest quality groups, respectively.