Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?
构建了一个CEO薪酬的均衡模型，发现CEO才能差异很小但足以解释薪酬差距，而1980-2003年间美国CEO薪酬的六倍增长完全可由大公司市值的六倍增长解释。
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay depends on both the size of his firm and the aggregate firm size. The model determines the level of CEO pay across firms and over time, offering a benchmark for calibratable corporate finance. We find a very small dispersion in CEO talent, which nonetheless justifies large pay differences. In recent decades at least, the size of large firms explains many of the patterns in CEO pay, across firms, over time, and between countries. In particular, in the baseline specification of the model's parameters, the sixfold increase of U.S. CEO pay between 1980 and 2003 can be fully attributed to the sixfold increase in market capitalization of large companies during that period.