UK Competition Policy and Shareholder Value: The Impact of Merger Inquiries
研究1989-2002年间英国50起并购案例，发现竞争监管并未普遍损害股东价值，但监管制度不稳定时资本市场效率降低。
Some previous studies have suggested that competition régimes can destroy shareholder value. This study examines data on 50 mergers in the UK between 1989 and 2002. The study confirms the finding from earlier studies of greater gains to shareholders in target than bidding companies, but does not find evidence supporting overall loss of shareholder value to target company shareholders when a merger is prohibited. It finds evidence that when the regulatory régime is stable and well understood the capital market behaves efficiently in response to new information. However, for a subgroup of the mergers involving companies with a new regulatory régime, where the industry and the stock market had little or no experience with respect to mergers, the capital market operated less efficiently.