Market power, price discrimination, and allocative efficiency in intermediate‐goods markets
研究垄断供应商在不对称下游企业间最优选择两部收费合同，发现歧视性合同通过降低高效企业批发价提升配置效率，而禁止价格歧视会降低效率并损害消费者剩余和福利。
We consider a monopolistic supplier's optimal choice of two‐part tariff contracts when downstream firms are asymmetric. We find that the optimal discriminatory contracts amplify differences in downstream firms' competitiveness. Firms that are larger—either because they are more efficient or because they sell a superior product—obtain a lower wholesale price than their rivals. This increases allocative efficiency by favoring the more productive firms. In contrast, we show that a ban on price discrimination reduces allocative efficiency and can lead to higher wholesale prices for all firms. As a result, consumer surplus, industry profits, and welfare are lower.