Management Buyout Proposals and inside Information
研究撤回的管理层收购提案对股价的影响，发现除非后续有收购要约，否则股价不会显著上涨，且完成收购的管理层并不比撤回提案的管理层更可能拥有内幕信息，表明内幕信息并非管理层收购的常见动机。
ABSTRACT This paper explores stock price behavior surrounding withdrawn buyout proposals to determine whether managers' proposal announcements reveal any information which is unrelated to the efficiency gains associated with completed buyouts. On average, firms whose managers withdraw buyout proposals do not sustain significantly positive stock price effects unless they receive subsequent acquisition bids. In addition, managers of firms with completed buyouts are no more likely to have access to inside information than managers who withdrew proposals. I interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the notion that inside information commonly motivates management buyout proposals.